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Abstract
We revisit the performance enhancing drug game by applying models of
guilt aversion and reciprocity. Both models fit within the framework of psy-
chological game theory in that they allow payoffs to depend on beliefs. We
explore the extent to which social norms can help reduce or eliminate doping
in sport. With reciprocity we see that first-order beliefs on the prevalence of
doping are key and a norm of clean sport would require a coordinated shift
in such beliefs. With guilt aversion, by contrast, second-order beliefs are key
and individuals may have an incentive to race clean even if they expect com-
petitors will dope. Our results point to the importance for sports bodies and
coaches to manage the beliefs of athletes.
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1 Introduction
Many have argued that norms of fair play are crucial in efforts to eliminate or reduce
doping in sport (e.g. Bird and Wagner 1997; Eber 2011). A particularly important
contribution to the literature is provided by Eber (2008) who incorporates fair play
norms into the performance-enhancing drug game of Haugen (2004) (which is itself
closely related to games considered by Breivik 1992 and Berentsen 2002). Eber
(2008) shows that a norm against obtaining an unfair advantage can fundamentally
change incentives within the game and convert it from a prisoners dilemma game
(with a unique Nash equilibrium of doping) to a coordination game (with a Nash
equilibrium of no doping). Consistent with this approach, abundant survey evidence
shows, as I will shortly review, that doping intentions are strongly correlated to
an athlete’s moral and normative views concerning doping (e.g Kavussanu 2008;
Morente-Sánchez and Zabala 2013; Ntoumanis et al. 2014).
Taking Eber (2008) as my starting paint, the current paper is motivated by
two basic observations. First, the literature on social norms has highlighted many
different channels through which norms may work (Bicchieri 2018). For instance, a
norm may be driven by fear that transgressions will be punished, or it could be driven
by avoidance of guilt. Moreover, an extensive experimental literature has shown that
beliefs, intentions, and beliefs about intentions are an important part of the mix
alongside actions (e.g. Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2008). It is important, therefore,
to consider a range of different models of social norms and social preferences to see
if the results of Eber (2008) are sensitive to specific modeling assumptions. In the
current paper we compare and contrast three seminal models of social preferences.
We will see that this gives new insight and a more complete picture of how norms
can influence doping.
That brings us to the second observation motivating this paper. The results
of Eber (2008) suggest some significant hurdles have to be overcome if a no doping
equilibrium is going to emerge. Most importantly, all athletes have to feel negatively
about gaining an unfair advantage. If one athlete is selfish than any no doping
equilibrium unravels. This means it is vital to explore whether norms of fair play, and
the strong moral and normative views we know many athletes hold about doping,
can realistically reduce doping in sport. The analysis to follow shows that the
specific mechanism driving the social norm is crucial. In particular, if guilt is the
main driving force then there are less hurdles to overcome in trying to reduce doping.
This, as I shall discuss, has practical policy implications.
The preceding discussion briefly picked up the role of beliefs and intentions. This
will be a key theme in the paper and so to introduce the basic issues consider the
norm ‘do not dope if others do not dope’. Realistically, an athlete does not know
for sure the actions of others and so he simply does not know whether they will
dope or not. He must, therefore, base his actions on beliefs about the actions of
others. For instance, the norm could be written ‘I will not dope if I believe others
are not doping’. Or it might be that ‘I will not dope if I believe that others expect
me to not dope’. Moreover, an athlete may care about the intentions behind doping.
For example, that a competitor dopes to gain an unfair advantage may seem worse
than a competitor who dopes because they believed others would try to gain an
advantage. This means we need to capture beliefs about intentions (Rabin 1993).
In exploring the role of beliefs we also, crucially, need to recognize that beliefs may
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be incorrect. For instance, an athlete may overestimate the prevalence of doping
(Petroczi et al. 2008). Ideally, therefore, we need to directly capture beliefs and
recognize that the beliefs people act upon may be wrong.
Psychological game theory allows for payoffs to depend on both actions and be-
liefs (Geanakopolos, Pearce and Stacchetti 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009)
and so provides a general framework with which to model norms of fairness and reci-
procity (e.g. Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher
2006). In the current paper I apply two seminal models from psychological game
theory, one based on guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Battigalli and
Dufwenberg 2007, 2009; see also Bacharach et al. 2007) and another based on reci-
procity (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). These models not only
allows us to capture beliefs but also to explore the implications of incorrect beliefs.
For instance, in the case of reciprocity it would seem possible, a-priori, that an ath-
lete may feel less negatively about a competitor who dopes if he believes that this
competitor expected others to dope. In this case the athlete expects his competi-
tor to have wrong beliefs (that others will dope) and would judge ‘fairness’ relative
to those wrong beliefs. We can only pick up such possibilities by explicitly taking
beliefs into account, as in psychological game theory.
Consistent with the findings of Eber (2008) I find that both guilt aversion and
reciprocity can result in an equilibrium with no doping. As already previewed, how-
ever, specific predictions depend crucially on whether guilt aversion or reciprocity
is the driving factor. Guilt aversion focuses on second-order beliefs in saying that
an athlete will race clean if he believes that others expect him to do so. We shall
see that this can provide a strong incentive to race clean. Indeed, guilt aversion
can mean it is optimal for an athlete to race clean irrespective of what others do.
Reciprocity, by contrast, focuses on first-order beliefs in saying that an athlete will
race clean if he believes others will do so. We shall see that this results in a weaker
incentive to race clean and in this sense provides results closer to those of Eber
(2008).
The implications of these findings will be discussed more as we proceed. It is
worth noting, however, that both guilt aversion and reciprocity are likely to be im-
portant motives driving behavior (Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt 2011).
A main contribution of the current paper is, therefore, to highlight the importance
of beliefs for doping in sport. To illustrate the potential implications let me begin
by highlighting that current estimates on the prevalence of doping vary enormously
(Dilger, Frick and Tolsdorf 2007). Indeed, it would not be pushing things too much
to say that all we know for certain is that the proportion of athletes who dope is
somewhere between 0 and 100 percent. Clearly, such uncertainty gives considerable
leeway for athletes to form their own beliefs.
In order to minimize doping we need athletes to have relatively optimistic first-
order beliefs. In an environment, however, where the media and authorities fo-
cus on doping scandals it seems almost inevitable that athletes will form relatively
pessimistic first-order beliefs. Anshel (1991), for instance, found that the media’s
reporting of drug use by ‘established sports stars’ influenced general use of per-
formance enhancement. It may, therefore, be important to ‘manage’ the beliefs of
athletes. In a variety of contexts, including attitudes to body-image and alcohol
consumption, it has been shown that ‘correcting’ erroneous beliefs can change be-
havior (Perkins 2002; Bergstrom and Neighbors 2006). This would suggest a role for
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athletes, coaches and the sporting authorities to create a more balanced impression
on doping (Englar-Carlson et al. 2016). If a young athlete is surrounded by stories
of doping then it would not be a surprise for that athlete to form pessimistic beliefs
and consequently go down a doping route.
Care is also needed in terms of second-order beliefs. For an interesting example
consider the current scandal engulfing Russian sport (McClaren 2016). The basic
impression being created is one in which all Russian athletes dope. A young Russian
athlete may clearly interpret this as a signal that others will think she is doping
(whatever she does). In other words she will form pessimistic second-order beliefs.
This, in turn, provides little incentive for her to race clean. Again, therefore, it would
seem important that those involved in sport create an environment that emphasizes
clean sport rather than overly dwelling on evidence of doping.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I briefly review the literature con-
necting norms and moral beliefs to doping. In Section 3 the performance-enhancing
drug game is introduced. For completeness, Section 4 analyzes a model of inequal-
ity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) that is in modeling terms identical to that of
Eber (2008). Section 5 analyzes a model of reciprocity and Section 6 a model of
guilt aversion. Section 7 concludes.
2 Doping, norms and beliefs
There is an extensive literature looking at the factors which influence an athlete’s
decision to dope. Given that there are two recent, excellent reviews of this literature,
namely Morente-Sánchez and Zabala (2013) and Ntoumanis et al. (2014), it is not
my intension here to survey that literature in any great depth. Instead I want to
pick out results from the literature that seem particularly pertinent to the role that
beliefs and norms can play in doping.
Let me begin with a quote from Strelan and Boeckmann (2006: p. 2912) that
nicely sets the seen: ‘[T]he results of more than 50 perceptual-deterrence studies
conducted over a range of unlawful behaviors from the petty (e.g. underage drink-
ing, marijuana use) to the serious (e.g. rape, domestic abuse, drunk driving, tax
fraud) have consistently shown that legal-sanction threats have little or no impact
on decisions to engage in criminal acts. Rather, individuals are most likely to be
deterred from illegal activity by their moral beliefs and their fear of social disap-
proval.’ This passage refers to studies that did not directly look at doping in sport.
The consistent picture that emerges, though, from the study of Strelan and Boeck-
mann (2006) and others is that doping in sport is no different. Moral beliefs and
norms (together with health concerns) consistently show up as the major deterrents
against doping.
This overall finding points to the critical role that norms and beliefs can play
(and arguably must play) in combating doping. And note that much of the literature
directly studies elite athletes and so the evidence is robust to this, non-random, sub-
set of the population (Morente-Sanchez and Zabala 2013). Many different notions of
moral beliefs and norms are, though, considered in the literature (see, for example,
Kavussanu 2008 and Ntoumanis et al. 2014). So, in motivating the analysis of
the current paper, I want to decompose the overall finding that norms matter and
distinguish the different channels through which this can manifest itself. And I
particularly want to distinguish the role of first and second-order beliefs. I will start
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by looking at second-order beliefs because this is where most evidence exists.
Recall that second-order beliefs capture an athlete’s expectation about what
others expect her to do. In short, does she think others expect her to dope? Such
beliefs, as we shall see in Section 5, are critical in models of guilt aversion and moral
sanctioning. A wide range of studies have found that guilt (sometimes subsumed
under moral beliefs), together with the likely response of friends, colleagues and the
public, are strong indicators of doping perception and intentions (e.g. Goulet et al.
2010; Overbye Knudsen and Pfister 2013; Jalleh, Donovan and Jonling 2014). It is
important to highlight, however, that there are many channels through which this
influence can materialize. For instance, Strelan and Boeckmann (2006) find that
guilt has a strong effect, while the reaction of an important other, teammate or the
public has a milder effect. Other studies, by contrast, have found a strong effect
from the likely reaction of those close to the athlete (Overbye et al. 2013) or of the
general public (Huybers and Mazanov 2012).
First-order beliefs capture an athlete’s expectation about the likely behavior
of other athletes. In short, are others going to dope? Such beliefs, as we shall
see in Section 6, naturally feed into models of reciprocity and fairness. There are
surprisingly few studies that directly elicit first-order beliefs and so the evidence
here is necessarily weaker. Even so, there is consistent evidence that attitudes to
doping are influenced by the likely prevalence of doping amongst competitors (e.g.
Petróczi et al. 2008; Bloodworth and McNamee 2010; Kirby, Moran and Guerin
2011; Barkoukis, Lazurus and Tsorbatzoudis 2014). Specifically, there is a positive
correlation between beliefs on the doping of others and own intention to dope.
The preceding discussion suggests that both first and second-order beliefs are
likely to play an important role in an athlete’s decision to dope. But, can we say
which has the stronger effect? The study of Barkoukis et al. (2014) is particularly
relevant in this regard as it allows a direct comparison of first-order beliefs (which
they refer to as descriptive norms) and second-order beliefs (subjective norms).1
While both first and second order beliefs are found to be predictors of doping sus-
ceptibility, second order beliefs are the stronger predictor. Similarly, Overbye et
al. (2013) found that the opinion, doping would be ‘unfair to competitors who do
not dope’ was important but less so than guilt and the opinions of others. Also,
‘competitors have started to use doping’ was less important than things like poten-
tial medical supervision and benefits. Both of these studies suggest that first-order
beliefs may be less of an influence than second-order beliefs. This could be crucial,
as I discuss more in the conclusion.
Before we proceed to the formal analysis let me make the fairly obvious caveat
that the analysis will not be able to capture all the subtle ways in which norms and
beliefs may impact on the doping decision. Instead I shall focus on the rather blunt
instrument of first and second-order beliefs in a two player game. Moreover, I shall
not be able to take account of all the many different ways in which social norms can
be modeled. In analyzing and comparing three seminal and very widely used models
of social norms we do, though, gain critical new insight on the role that norms and
1To measure descriptive norms subjects are asked questions of the form ‘How many athletes at
your competitive level do you believe engage in doping to enhance their performance’. This is a
direct elicitation of first-order beliefs. To measure subjective norms subjects are asked questions
of the form ‘Most people I know would approve of me using prohibited substances to enhance my
performance during this season’. This is a direct elicitation of second-order beliefs.
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beliefs can play in doping decisions.
3 The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game
Consider the following doping game studied by Haugen (2004) and Eber (2008).2
There are two, risk neutral, athletes (i = 1, 2) involved in a competition. They
simultaneously and independently of each other must decide whether to dope (D)
or not dope (ND).3 The prize for winning the competition is w > 0 and the cost of
doping is h ≥ 0. In interpretation h may include health costs or potential sanctions
for being caught doping. If neither athlete dopes, or both athletes dope, then each
has probability 1/2 of winning the prize. If an athlete dopes and his competitor does
not then his probability of winning the prize increases from 1/2 to p > 1/2. The
corresponding payoffs to each of the four possible outcomes are detailed in Table 1.
Athlete 2
D ND
Athlete 1 D w/2− h,w/2− h pw − h, (1− p)w
ND (1− p)w, pw − h w/2, w/2
Table 1: The performance-enhancing drug game payoff matrix
An action profile a = (a1, a2) details the actions of each athlete where ai ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability that athlete i = 1, 2 dopes. In order to apply psychological game
theory we need to take account of first-order and second-order beliefs. Let bij ∈ [0, 1]
denote athlete i’s belief about aj. In other words, bij is athlete i’s belief about the
probability his competitor will dope. Also, let ciji ∈ [0, 1] denote athlete i’s belief
about bji. In other words ciji is athlete i’s belief about athlete j’s first-order belief.
For instance, if bij = 1 and ciji = 0 then athlete i believes athlete j will dope and
he believes that athlete j believes he will not dope.
Let ui (a) denote the von-Neumann Morgenstern expected payoff of athlete i =





2) ≥ u1 (a1, a∗2) for all a1 ∈ [0, 1] and u2 (a∗1, a∗2) ≥ u2 (a∗1, a2) for all a2 ∈ [0, 1].
In other words, at a Nash equilibrium, neither athlete can gain from unilateral devi-
ation. It is trivial to see that if (p− 1/2)w > h then both athletes have a dominant
strategy to dope. This means that action profile (1, 1) is the unique Nash equi-
librium. It is also trivial that action profile (0, 0) is Pareto efficient and maximizes
total payoff. The game has, therefore, the structure of a prisoners’ dilemma (Haugen
2004). In the following we restrict attention to the case where (p− 1/2)w > h.
Let me remark that the performance-enhancing drug game assumes symmetry in
ability, gains from doping and costs of doping. This simplifying assumption can be
justified on the grounds that we are focusing on two closely matched athletes who,
because they are so closely matched, have a strong incentive to dope. For instance,
2For analysis of closely related games see Breivik (1992) and Berentsen (2002). For analysis of
a many player version of the game see Haugen, Nepusz and Petróczi (2013).
3Note that the recent game theoretic literature on doping has utilized contest theory to analyze
settings where, amongst other things, effort is also a choice variable (e.g. Krakel 2007; Ryvkin
2013; Mohan and Hazari 2016). Here we focus on the performance enhancing drug game to make
the analysis as transparent as possible.
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Berentsen (2002) shows that if we have two athletes who differ a lot in ability then
there will exist a no doping equilibrium independent of any social norms (see also
Breivik 1992). Even so, it is important to question whether the results to follow
are sensitive to the assumption of symmetry and so I will comment on this as we
proceed.
4 Inequality aversion
In this section I work briefly through the model of inequality aversion due to Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). Let me highlight that this model does not take account of beliefs
and so is included here primarily as a comparator for the psychological game theory
models that follow in Sections 5 and 6. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model pro-
vides a useful benchmark for two reasons. Most importantly, the approach used by
Eber (2008) is closely related to that of inequality aversion and so working through
the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model allows me to summarize the main findings of
Eber (2008). Also, there are many comparisons in the literature between inequality
aversion and theories based on psychological game theory (e.g. Bacharach, Guerra
and Zizzo 2007; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2008; Xiao and Bicchieri 2010) and so
it is interesting to also provide that comparison here.
The starting point for inequality aversion is that the ‘fairest’ outcome is one in
which both players have the same expected payoff. Given that both athletes are
symmetric this seems reasonable. An athlete then experiences disutility if they earn
less than others (which could reflect envy) or more than others (which could reflect
guilt). In interpreting aversion from earning more than others it is important to
recognize that inequality aversion is based on payoffs and not competitive outcomes.
So, it is not so much athletes do not want to win but that they may not want excessive
monetary reward for winning.4 Parameters αi and βi measure the sensitivity of
athlete i to earning less and more than others, where αi ≥ βi ≥ 0. Taking inequality
aversion into account transforms the standard performance-enhancing drug game to
the one depicted in Table 2. If both athletes dope or both do not dope then they
get the same material payoff and so there is no inequality. If, by contrast, athlete
1 dopes and athlete 2 does not then athlete 1 has a material payoff advantage of
pw − h − (1 − p)w = w (2p− 1) − h. Denote this difference D. Athlete 1’s payoff
then consists of his material payoff, pw − h, and disutility from having gained an
advantage, β1D. Athlete 2’s payoff consists of his material payoff, (1− p)w, and
disutility from being at a disadvantage, α2D. A similar logic treats the case where
athlete 2 dopes and athlete 1 does not.
Athlete 2
D ND
Athlete 1 D w/2− h,w/2− h pw − h− β1D, (1− p)w − α2D
ND (1− p)w − α1D, pw − h− β2D w/2, w/2
Table 2: The performance-enhancing drug game with inequality aversion
4Inequality aversion is less well suited to asymmetric situations in which one athlete might
naturally be expected to earn a higher payoff than his competitor.
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The key insight from Eber (2008) is that inequality aversion can transform the
performance-enhancing drug game into a coordination game. In particular, action
profile (0, 0) will be a Nash equilibrium if
w
2
≥ pw − h− βi (w (2p− 1)− h)














Note that action profile (1, 1) remains a Nash equilibrium. Inequality aversion,
therefore, can generate a coordination game in which it is an equilibrium for neither
to dope and an equilibrium for both to dope.
In order to gain further insight let us look in more detail at the incentives of
athlete 1. Suppose that athlete 2 dopes with probability q. Then the expected
payoff of athlete 1 if he dopes is qw/2+(1− q) (pw − β1D)−h. His expected payoff
if he does not dope is q ((1− p)w − α1D) + (1− q)w/2. Hence, it is optimal for










D (α1 + β1)
= q < q. (2)
Note that q < 1/2, because w (p− 1/2) > h and α1 ≥ β1. It is, therefore, optimal for
athlete 1 to dope if he thinks athlete 2 will dope with probability 1/2 or more. This
means that the doping equilibrium (1, 1) is risk dominant (Eber 2008). Equilibrium
(0, 0) is payoff dominant. If, therefore, condition (1) is satisfied we have a stag-hunt
coordination game.5
Before we move on let me relate the above analysis to that of Eber (2008). Rather
than look at inequality in payoffs (as in the Fehr and Scmhidt (1999) model) Eber
(2008) focuses on inequality in the probability of winning. In this case an athlete
feels averse to gaining an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage or seeing the other athlete
gain an unfair advantage. This provides a different interpretation of fairness to
that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). But in practical terms it is equivalent to setting
D = (p− 1/2)w in Table 2, with an appropriate reinterpretation of αi and βi. All
the analysis discussed above, thus, follows through in an almost identical fashion to












Not surprisingly, the findings of Eber (2008) are, thus, unchanged whether we con-
sider inequality aversion in payoffs or fairness based on unfair advantage.6
5The evidence on behavior in games with Pareto ranked equilibria is mixed in terms of which
equilibrium is most likely to emerge (Devetag and Ortmann 2007). It is important to recognize,
however, that in terms of material payoffs the performance-enhancing drug game is still a prisoners
dilemma and so the experimental evidence on linear public good games is also relevant (e.g. Wolff
2017). Again, the evidence is mixed (Chaudhuri 2011). One can, however, note that inequality
aversion is often given as an explanation for cooperation in public good games (e.g. Fehr and
Schmidt 1999).
6More generally, one can envisage settings where doping may dramatically increase an athletes
chance of winning but make little difference to payoff inequality and vice-versa. Hence the difference
may matter. The main reason it does not do so here is the assumption of symmetry.
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The preceding analysis shows that a norm, whether motivated by inequality or
otherwise, can result in a no doping equilibrium. Arguably, however, the story is not
that compelling. First, we require both athletes to dislike having a payoff advantage.
Experimental evidence does suggest that many people dislike advantageous inequal-
ity (e.g. Bellemare, Kröger and Van Soest 2008; Beranek, Cubitt and Gächter 2015,
Yang, Onderstal and Schram 2016). Even so, it only takes one athlete to be self
focused for the no doping equilibrium to unravel. And the ‘win at all costs’ approach
of athletes (Krumer, Shavit and Rosenboim 2011) suggests this is likely. Second, we
require the athletes to ‘coordinate’ in the sense that they converge to the no doping
equilibrium. The preceding analysis, for instance, gives limited insight on what will
happen if the two athletes have wrong beliefs about the actions of the other. Third,
inequality aversion is highly dependent on symmetry. If the athletes start unequal,
because one has a higher ability, then the fairest outcome may not be one in which
both have the same material payoff.
Given the various issues mentioned in the preceding discussion it seems vital to
explore, in more depth, the extent to which social norms can realistically incentivize
an athlete to not dope. This motivates the analysis to follow in which we consider
alternative models of social preferences. While inequality aversion provides a simple,
reduced form model, it has been argued that psychological game theory offers a
more nuanced approach (Camerer 2003; Sobel 2005; Battigali and Dufwenberg 2009;
Cartwright 2014). In the following I will look at models of reciprocity and guilt
aversion to see if any extra insight can be gained on the ways in which doping can
be reduced.
5 Reciprocity
In this section I will work through the model of fairness due to Rabin (1993) (draw-
ing also on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). The key underlying idea is that an
athlete will want to reciprocate the kindness (or unkindness) of the other athlete.
If, for instance, athlete 2 does not dope then this is kind because it increases the
expected payoff of athlete 1. Athlete 1 may desire to reciprocate this act of kind-
ness by also not doping. On the flip side, if athlete 2 dopes then this is unkind
and athlete 2 may desire to reciprocate by also doping. Note that this notion of
reciprocation is broadly consistent with the notion of fairness used by Eber (2008),
whereby an athlete considers it ‘fair’ to use drugs if her competitor also does but
‘unfair’ to do so if her competitor does not take drugs. It is also consistent with
the evidence discussed earlier that athletes willingness to use drugs appears to be
positively correlated with first-order beliefs on the doping of others.
To introduce the model more formally let us work through a specific scenario
that leads to a no doping equilibrium. Suppose that athlete 1 believes that athlete
2 will not dope, i.e. b12 = 0. Given this belief, athlete 1 expects that by choosing
to dope the monetary payoff of athlete 2 will be (1− p)w. Also, he expects that by
choosing not to dope the monetary payoff of athlete 2 will be w/2. Following Rabin
(1993: p. 1286) the equitable payoff of athlete 2 is then calculated as the midpoint
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between these extremes7
πe2 (b12 = 0) =







The kindness of athlete 1 towards athlete 2 if he does not dope is then given by
the difference between athlete 2’s received and equitable payoff













That this value is positive shows that athlete 1 is being kind towards athlete 2 by
not doping. The kindness of athlete 1 towards athlete 2 if he does dope is given by











That this value is negative shows that athlete 1 is being unkind towards athlete 2
by doping.
We next consider athlete 1’s belief about how kind athlete 2 is being towards
him. This will depend on athlete 1’s second-order beliefs. Suppose that c121 = 0
and so athlete 1 believes athlete 2 expects him to not dope. Then, retaining the
assumption that b12 = 0, athlete 1’s belief about the kindness of athlete 2 is given
by








This value is positive because athlete 1 believes that athlete 2 will not dope and is,
therefore, being kind.
The overall expected payoff of athlete 1 if he does not dope is then given by













where r1 measures athlete 1’s sensitivity to reciprocity. The basic idea here is that
athlete 1 wants to be kind because he believes that athlete 2 is being kind. His
expected payoff if he dopes is given by








In this case athlete 1 experiences disutility from failing to reciprocate athlete 2’s
kindness.
We can see that athlete 1 gets a higher payoff from not doping (given his beliefs)















A fairness equilibrium (as defined by Rabin 1993) exists when each athlete maximizes
his payoff given his beliefs and those beliefs are correct.9 So, a no doping equilibrium
7One could consider alternatives to this definition of equitable payoff. For instance, Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) associate equitable payoff with everyone getting the same payoff.
8Recall that (p− 1/2)w > h and so we require r1 > 0.
9Fairness equilibrium is the natural extension of Nash equilibrium to psychological games.
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exists (where a1 = b12 = c121 = 0 and a2 = b21 = c212 = 0) if both athletes are
sufficiently sensitive to reciprocity. Note that a doping equilibrium would also still
exist (where a1 = b12 = c121 = 1 and a2 = b21 = c212 = 1) for any values of r1 and
r2. Moreover, it is simple to check that there cannot exist an equilibrium where one
athlete dopes and the other does not.10 The reciprocity model, therefore, gives very
similar results to that of inequality aversion in terms of equilibrium predictions.
In order to consider non-equilibrium predictions, let us generalize the preceding
discussion and simply say that athlete 1 believes that athlete 2 will dope with
probability b12. Given this belief, athlete 1 expects that by choosing to dope the
monetary payoff of athlete 2 will be (1− b12) (1− p)w + b12w/2. Also, he expects
that by choosing not to dope the monetary payoff will be (1− b12)w/2+b12pw. The
equitable payoff is, therefore,
πe2 (b12) =














The kindness of athlete 1 towards athlete 2 if he does not dope is then given by
the difference between athlete 2’s received payoff and the equitable payoff



















The kindness of athlete 1 towards athlete 2 if he dopes is given by k12 (a1 = 1, b12) =
− (p− 1/2)w/2. Crucially, note that kindness does not depend on first-order beliefs.
Similarly, athlete 1’s belief about the kindness of athlete 2 will not depend on second-
order beliefs.
The overall expected payoff of athlete 1 if he does not dope is, therefore, given
by
π1 (a1 = 0, b12, c121) = b12
(




































Note that his expected payoff does depend on first-order belief b12. His expected
payoff if he dopes is given by
































= b < b12. (4)
Given that b < 1/2 it is optimal for athlete 1 to dope if he believes that athlete 2
will dope with probability 1/2 or more.
10Consider, for instance, the situation where athlete 1 dopes and athlete 2 does not. Athlete 1
is being unkind while athlete 2 is being kind. It follows that athlete 2 would have an incentive to
dope.
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This latter finding is similar to the result obtained with inequality aversion.
Here, though, we gain additional insight because beliefs are explicitly modeled. The
interesting thing to observe is that second-order beliefs drop out of the picture. In
interpretation this means that athlete 1 is indifferent to the beliefs of athlete 2. He
does not, for instance, consider it less unkind that athlete 2 would dope because
he expects others to dope. Doping is unkind, no matter what the cause. This
means that an athlete’s incentives to dope are driven solely by first-order beliefs
on the likely doping intention of the other athlete. The more pessimistic his belief,
however correct that belief may be, the more incentive to dope. This raises the
fundamental question of factors that influence beliefs. We discuss this more in
Section 7 but mention here that a range of factors including feedback from coaches,
teammates and the media are likely to matter. And, as pointed out by a reviewer,
past experience may be especially pivotal. In particular, an athlete who has lost
previous competitions may form pessimistic first-order beliefs. This would suggest
that less able athletes may be more prone to doping (because they form pessimistic
first-order beliefs).
So what have we learned from the reciprocity based model of fairness? The main
lesson appears to be that the results from Eber (2008) are extendable to a model that
(a) takes full account of beliefs and (b) is based on reciprocity rather than inequality
aversion. This speaks to the robustness of the findings of Eber (2008). Furthermore,
the analysis of this section is not dependent on symmetry because kindness is judged
relative to an equitable payoff that is based on the maximum and minimum material
payoff an athlete could earn. The analysis of this section, thus, readily extends to
settings with asymmetric ability. Difficult questions remain, however, about how
readily doping can be reduced. In particular, a no doping equilibrium requires both
athletes to value reciprocity. Moreover, we see the critical role of first-order beliefs
as captured in equation (4) - an athlete is only going to refrain from doping if he
is optimistic that the other athlete will also refrain from doping. So, we need both
athletes to be ‘optimistic reciprocators’
6 Guilt Aversion
In this section we turn to a model of guilt aversion based on Charness and Dufwen-
berg (2006) (see also Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009; Cartwright 2018). Guilt
aversion pays particular attention to second-order beliefs and the idea of ‘letting
someone down’. If an athlete does not dope then this may be unexpected but is
clearly not a reason for guilt. If, however, an athlete dopes then he may experience
guilt. The size of guilt is assumed to depend crucially on the athlete’s beliefs about
what he was expected to do. For instance, if c121 = 1 then athlete 1 believes he was
expected to dope and so has no reason to feel guilt if he does dope. But, if c121 = 0
then athlete 1 believes he was not expected to dope and so will experience guilt.
The standard framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) assumes that the
extent of guilt athlete 1 experiences will depend on the difference between the re-
alized and expected payoff of athlete 2. So, the athlete feels guilt at letting his
competitor down. This is an assumption that would seem at odds with the evidence
athletes express greater guilt at letting down friends, family and teammates, rather
than competitors (e.g. Bloodworth and McNamee 2010; Overbye et al. 2013). Note,
however, that the zero-sum nature of the prize allocation means that the amount
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athlete 2 looses is equal to the amount athlete 1 gains. So, we can equivalently say
that athlete 1 feels guilt in proportion to the amount he gains by doping or the
amount athlete 2 loses. Moreover, in interpretation, we can think of c121 as measur-
ing athlete 1’s overall belief about the expectations of others, including friends and
team mates.11
To formally explore the consequences of guilt aversion let us begin by looking for
a no doping equilibrium. So, consider action profile (0, 0) and second-order beliefs
c121 = c212 = 0. Expected payoffs are w/2 for both athletes. If athlete 1 were to
‘deviate from what was expected’ and dope then athlete 2’s payoff would drop to
(1−p)w. The overall drop in payoff is w/2− (1− p)w = w (p− 1/2). The expected
payoff of athlete 1 is then given by





where γ1 is athlete 1’s sensitivity to guilt. So, athlete 1 maximizes his payoff by not






) < γ1. (5)
If, therefore, guilt aversion is sufficiently strong athlete 1 does not have an incentive
to dope. Which means that if both athletes are sufficiently guilt averse there exists
a no doping equilibrium.
The existence of a no doping equilibrium is clearly consistent with the results
derived with inequality aversion and reciprocity. From here on, however, things
begin to diverge. To see why, suppose that athlete 1 believes athlete 2 will dope
with probability b12. Then athlete 2’s expected payoff if athlete 1 does not dope
is (1− b12)w/2 + q (pw − h) and athlete 2’s expected payoff if athlete 1 dopes is
(1− b12) (1− p)w+ q (w/2− h). Note that the difference is again w (p− 1/2). The
guilt that athlete 1 experiences will depend on this payoff difference and his second-
order beliefs c121. In particular, the expected payoff of athlete 1 if he dopes is equal
to
g1 (a1 = 1, b12, c121) = (1− b12) pw +
b12w
2






If c121 = 1 and so athlete believes he was expected to dope then he experiences no
guilt. If c121 = 0 then he experiences maximum guilt. Guilt, therefore, critically
depends on second-order beliefs. Herein we see why guilt cannot be modeled merely
as a fixed cost from doping.12
If he does not dope the expected payoff of athlete 1 is (1− b12)w/2+b12 (1− p)w.









) − 1 < c121.
11In a model of reciprocity this interpretation would not be valid because the kindness of athlete
2 is, in principle, based on what he believed athlete 1 would do.
12Even if we move away from a belief based model of guilt aversion it is still insufficient to
model guilt as a fixed cost. For instance, guilt may be influenced by norms which then depend
on a reference point. Such a model would give similar results to that of the belief based model
(Cartwright 2018).
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Note that if c121 = 0 then this condition reduces to condition (5). It is, therefore,
optimal for athlete 1 to not dope if he believes he is expected to not dope and his
sensitivity to guilt aversion is sufficiently strong. Crucially, athlete 1’s incentive
to dope is independent of his first-order belief. In particular, it may be optimal
for athlete 1 to not dope even if he believes athlete 2 will dope. This outcome is
consistent with the evidence that guilt is a strong predictor of doping intentions,
independent of the actions of others (e.g. Bloodworth and McNamee 2010; Barkoukis
et al. 2014).
The preceding analysis suggests that guilt aversion can result in a relatively
strong incentive to not dope. We do not, as is the case with inequality aversion or
reciprocity, need athletes to coordinate on a risk dominated equilibrium. We simply
need an athlete to believe others expect him to not dope and to feel guilt from
disappointing this expectation. Also, the analysis does not depend on symmetry
because guilt is measured by changes in absolute payoff. Note, however, that a
doping equilibrium, in which both athletes are expected to dope and so feel no guilt
from doping, still exists. It is also possible to have an equilibrium in which, say,
athlete 1 does not dope, because he would experience guilt from doing so, while
athlete 2 does dope. Guilt aversion does not, therefore, necessarily result in no
doping, even if the athletes are strongly guilt averse. Again, beliefs will matter.
Doping incentives, however, become more focused on the individual and what he
believes others expect of him than on the broader competition between athletes.
This could be crucial, as we shall now discuss, when we look at ways to combat
doping.
7 Conclusion
This paper explores the extent to which social norms can overcome incentives to
dope in sport. Three different models of social norms are considered and compared.
These are a model of inequality aversion, closely related to that considered by Eber
(2008), a model of reciprocity (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004)
and finally a model of guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). The latter
two models fit within the framework of psychological game theory and so allow us
to take explicit account of beliefs. We see that the models of inequality aversion
and reciprocity give very similar results and suggest that incentives to dope will
depend on first-order beliefs regarding the intentions of others to dope. The model
of guilt aversion gives contrasting results and suggests incentives to dope will depend
on second-order beliefs regarding whether an athlete believes others expect him to
dope.
All three models show that norms can support an equilibrium where athletes
refrain from doping. Beliefs, however, will prove crucial. In particular, reciprocity
can only work if athletes believe competitors will race clean while guilt aversion
can only work if athletes believe others expect them to race clean. In reality we
can, as discussed in Section 2, expect both reciprocity and guilt aversion to be
important determinants of behavior and so first and second-order beliefs will likely
matter. Moreover, it is beliefs rather than reality which will drive behavior. This
all suggests that it is essential that the fight against doping should pay attention
to clean athletes rather than become (or continue to be) a narrative dominated by
doping scandal (Englar-Carlson et al. 2016).
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Inequality aversion and reciprocity convert the performance-enhancing drug game
into a coordination game. While this does lead to the existence of an equilibrium
with no doping it is far from clear how easily this equilibrium can be reached. It only
needs, for instance, one athlete to dope, or to believe others will dope, for things to
unravel. Indeed, inequality aversion or reciprocity means that if one athlete dopes
others have even more incentive to dope because they dislike the ‘unfair’ advantage
obtained by the doper (Eber 2011). If, therefore, inequality aversion or reciprocity
are to work a substantial transformation in beliefs is required. Arguably this has
happened in cycling where a sport rife with doping has become clean (Lentillon-
Kaestner, Hagger and Hardcastle 2012). It is questionable, though, how easily this
example could be replicated in other domains.
Guilt aversion works differently in that an athlete may desire to race clean irre-
spective of what competitors do. This is because the athlete feels guilt from letting
down the expectations of others. Crucially, survey evidence suggests that letting
down others is a strong motivation against doping (e.g. Strelan and Boeckmann
2006; Barkoukis et al. 2014). It may, therefore, be possible to reduce doping with-
out a transformation of overall beliefs. Instead, individual athletes or teams of
athletes can be targeted. This is particularly relevant for national bodies or coaches
who have little control over the tendency of athletes outside their remit to dope
but can influence the second-order beliefs of their own athletes. The success of this
more individual approach will still, however, rely on the support of governing bodies,
particularly if clean athletes are likely to be less successful than dopers.
The absence of universal data on the prevalence of doping in sport means that
athletes will form their own subjective beliefs. Given the bias towards reporting
doping scandals it would not be a surprise if athletes form overly pessimistic beliefs
about doping in sport. And note that this can generate a self-fulfilling tendency to
dope (see, for instance, Bacharach et al. 2007). It would appear critical, therefore,
that athletes are offered positive, as well as negative, information regarding doping
and the expectations for clean sport. Clearly, it would be naive to think that a
positive vision will eliminate doping in sport. A more positive vision may, however,
have a pronounced effect on individual incentives and in so doing reduce the preva-
lence of doping (Schultz et al. 2007). The analysis of this paper shows that it is
particularly important to instill in athletes a (second-order) belief that they are not
expected to dope. There are practical measures that coaches, family and governing
bodies could do to bring this about, as seemingly evidenced by a transformation in
attitudes in road cycling.
This is not to say that the authorities should not aggressively try to eliminate
doping through testing. A balance, however, is needed. For instance, the current
whereabouts system of out-of-competition sampling together with strict liability
rules on doping give an impression of ‘guilty until proven innocent’. This ‘presump-
tion of guilt’ may influence beliefs, particularly, second-order beliefs in an undesirable
way. It is important, therefore, to recognize the role played by social norms. To sum
this up let me end with some quotes that I would endorse. Bird and Wagner (1997,
p. 755) write ‘the only real hope for ending the practice of doping lies in the norms
of fair competition among the athletes. Yet there is hope.’ This hope, though,
requires a blending of formal and informal sanctions because ‘[n]othing damages in-
formal norms more than the presence of a failed system of formal laws.’ Or to look
from a different angle, Strelan and Boeckmann (2006, p. 2925) write, ‘[i]t appears
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that legal sanctions are salient only to the extent that they convey information about
the moral and health costs associated with using banned drugs.’
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